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Abstract 
This paper seeks to explore the synergies between budget and policy through the use of what was 
called ‘spending conditionality’ in the EU and ‘conditional spending’ in the U.S. It adopts a legal 
comparative perspective and investigates the EU's very recent practice of conditioning public spending 
granted to EU Member States against the U.S. long-standing experience on the matter. The paper 
argues that the analysis of the U.S. experience with conditional spending facilitates a better 
understanding of the phenomenon in the EU and may usefully enrich the EU policy-thinking on 
conditionality in future financial frameworks. In particular, the comparative study shows that 
conditionality may prove an effective governance device to advance important Union-wide policy 
objectives at the state level. At the same time, the study shows that when used inside established 
constitutional systems, conditionality is not free from constitutional contestation, and must be tailored 
in a way that complies with the essential constitutional principles underlying the exercise of power in a 
federal, multi-level government. Most important, this work shows that the eventual failures of 
conditionality are very hard to correct through ex-post administrative and judicial control tools. 
Therefore, a thoughtful ex ante policy planning of conditionality is crucial for its effective operation. 
The last part of the paper identifies several lessons learned in this respect. 
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  1 
"There are sound reasons to have each federal dollar pursue as many objectives as possible. [...] But 
there is a limit to the number of concurrent objectives the recipients can successfully handle."1 
 
Introduction 
The European Union (EU) has recently experienced a massive rise of conditions attached to its 
internal budgetary expenditure. While the EU budget has been conditional since its first creation, the 
novel conditions attached to the 2014-2020 financial period are fundamentally different and deserve 
our special attention. In strong contrast with traditional administrative and fiscal prudence conditions, 
the novel spending conditions have primary a policy task. Hence, their primary goal is to promote 
broader EU policy objectives at the Member States' level using the EU budget as a lever toward this 
end. These conditions, in EU jargon conditionality or conditionalities, radically strengthen the EU's 
spending power and substantially enhance the policy relevance of EU spending.2 Conditions may 
require national plans on sustainable health infrastructure development, reform of labor market 
institutions, effective implementation of predating EU legislation on environment or capacity building 
of national administrations, subject to suspension of funds in case of failure to do so.3 
While the expansion of spending conditionality is so new in the EU, in the U.S. conditional spending 
has been widely practiced and fiercely debated for almost one century.4 Starting with the Supreme 
Court's incremental opinion in Butler case (1936)5 and ending with the most recent Obamacare case 
(Medicaid expansion, 2012),6 the increasing reach of the U.S. federal spending power, as well as of 
conditions attached to it, have mobilised immense scholarly, political and public interest.7 During this 
period, conditions linked to U.S. federal spending have been instrumental to promote important social, 
economic, administrative and political change. Conditions have inter alia supported desegregation in 
education and labor market,8 have established a national uniform highway speed limit,9 have 
persuaded states to adopt the 21 years old minimum drinking age,10 have facilitated military 
                                                     
* I am grateful to Harvard Law School and in particular to the conveners and participants of the 2017 Visiting Researchers 
and Visiting Scholars Program for the most welcoming research environment that made this work possible. My special 
gratitude goes to professor Mark Tushnet and professor Howell Jackson for their invaluable guidance and comments. The 
usual disclaimers apply. 
1  US Executive Office of the President and Office of Management and Budget, Managing Federal Assistance in the 1980’s: 
A Report to the Congress of the United States pursuant to the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977 
(Pub. L. 95-224) (Washington, D.C., 1980), 29, http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/000714046. 
2  Conditions are especially valuable for strengthening EU soft policy actions, typically adopted in areas of EU shared, 
coordinative or supportive competences specified at Art. 4-6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), OJ C 306, 2007. 
3  See, for the most representative conditions of the current period, Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, OJ L 347 of 20.12.2013, Arts 
2 (33), 19, 22-23, Annex XI. 
4  THEODORE SKY, TO PROVIDE FOR THE GENERAL WELFARE: A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL SPENDING POWER (2003). 
5  United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I (I936). 
6  Most recently, the discussion was reopened by the 2012 Supreme Court Decision in ‘Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius 
567 U.S. (2012)’, ('Obamacare'), Justia Law, accessed 15 November 2014, https://supreme.justia.com/ 
cases/federal/us/567/11-393/. 
7  The United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8. 
8  BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME 3: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 232–235 (2014). 
9  Ronald F. King, The politics of denial: the use of funding penalties as an implementation device for social policy, 20 
POLICY SCI. 307–337 (1987). 
10  Id. 
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recruitment in colleges,11 have contributed to the establishment of a politically independent civil 
service at the state level12 and have promoted legislation on minimum wage and overtime pay in 
federally funded activities.13 
Yet, why is the U.S. conditional spending relevant for the EU? 
This paper argues that the comparative analysis with the U.S. conditional spending system is timely, 
useful and highly informative for the EU for three main reasons.  
Firstly, the EU is now where the U.S. was in the mid-1900s − in an era of massive expansion of 
conditional spending. While the EU and the U.S. budgets are very different in spending composition 
and size,14 in both systems, the expenditure vested at the state level is one hundred percent conditional 
and the conditions of spending operate in a remarkably similar manner.15 
Secondly, the European Commission has recently started the policy planning of the next multiannual 
financial period.16 The current conditions of spending are expected to stay and may be credibly 
developed to include additional EU policy areas, including structural reforms, asylum and migration 
acquis, as well as EU's founding values of democracy, rule of law and human rights.17 Such a reform 
might have far reaching implications for the EU's policy making and enforcement toolkit in areas 
where the EU lacks credible instruments to induce change at the national level.18  
Lastly, and most importantly, as the author writes this contribution, the EU celebrates its sixty years 
anniversary in Rome, the place where a unified Europe was founded on March 25, 1957.19 Sixty years 
on, the EU is in search of a new start – a European New Deal.20 The reform agenda is expected to heal 
the weaknesses exposed by the 2008 financial crisis and by the subsequent constitutional, migration 
and security shocks which hit the very core of the EU and questioned its underlying mission.21 
Whatever path shall be agreed for the future of Europe, it shall necessarily be matched with correlative 
fiscal capacity and spending arrangements, which are already in the pipeline.22 It is highly unlikely 
that spending conditions will be absent from future EU fiscal policies, especially if the proposals for a 
                                                     
11  Id. 
12  RICHARD B. CAPPALLI, FEDERAL GRANTS AND COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 1801–1821. 
13  Id. at 1201–1311. 
14  See pp 6-26, infra. 
15  RONALD LAMPMAN WATTS, QUEEN’S UNIVERSITY (KINGSTON RELATIONS ONT ) INSTITUTE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL & 
QUEEN’S UNIVERSITY (KINGSTON STUDIES ONT ) SCHOOL OF POLICY, THE SPENDING POWER IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY (1999). 
16 High level group preliminary work on the post-2020 reform: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/ro/policy/how/ 
improving-investment/high-level-group-simplification/  
17  The Treaty on the European Union (TEU), Art. 2. See, SPIEGEL ONLINE, ‘Democracy in Europe: EU Commissioner 
Pushes for Hard Line on Poland’, accessed 15 March 2017, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/eu-commissioner-
pushes-for-hard-line-on-poland-a-1137672.html.  
18 DIMITRY KOCHENOV & ANDREW TREVOR WILLIAMS, EUROPE’S JUSTICE DEFICIT INTRODUCED (2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2534812 (last visited Mar 18, 2015); Carlos Closa, Dimitry Kochenov & J. H. H. Weiler, 
Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, Global Governance Programme-87 ROBERT SCHUMAN CENT. 
ADV. STUD. 
19  Treaty Establishing European Economic Community, signed in Rome, 25 March 1957, in force as of 1958. 
20  European Commission, WHITE PAPER ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE. REFLECTIONS AND SCENARIOS FOR THE EU27 BY 2025 
(2017). 
21  DE BURCA & GRAINNE, EUROPE’S RAISON D’ETRE (2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2224310 (last visited Jun 29, 
2016). 
22  EU High Level Group on Own Resources, FUTURE FINANCING OF THE EU FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
HIGH LEVEL GROUP ON OWN RESOURCES DECEMBER 2016; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REFLECTION PAPER ON THE FUTURE 
OF EU FINANCES (2017). 
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stand-alone budget to support the European Monetary Union, a future European defense Union or 
other possible European multi-speed Union configurations are agreed upon.23 On the contrary, it may 
be reasonably expected that these conditions shall be further consolidated and expanded departing 
from the current conditions of EU spending. 
Hence, the analysis of the U.S. century-long experience with conditional spending may help facilitate 
a deeper understanding of what the phenomenon is, how it could evolve a medium term and what are 
its deeper implications for the EU legal system in a long run. 
Against this backdrop, the present paper shall first briefly conceptualize the conditions of spending. 
The following section shall lay down the essential traits of the U.S. and EU conditional spending 
frameworks, with a particular emphasis on conditions' legal basis, evolution, administrative 
implementation, enforcement and judicial review. Based on the findings, the third section shall 
summarize the main similarities and differences of the two legal systems. Finally, several lessons 
useful to the EU policy thinking on spending conditionality shall be drawn. 
For the purpose of consistency, this paper shall use the term 'conditional spending' or 'conditions of 
spending' when referring to the U.S. legal system and 'spending conditionality' or 'conditionality' when 
referring to EU. The terms 'spending conditions', 'cross-cutting conditions' or 'conditions' shall be used 
interchangeably to refer to both the U.S. and the EU systems. 
Conceptualizing spending conditions  
Spending conditions as a governance device 
Spending conditions are essential elements in the art of governing though budgets. As noted by 
Daintith, a government may choose to deploy conditional financial resources to pursue specific policy 
objectives – ‘government by dominium’, in complementary or in parallel to binding legal rules backed 
by sanctions – ‘government by imperium’.24 In other words, instead of enacting traditional legal rules 
backed by sanctions, a government may find it more appropriate to govern through economic means 
and pursue a given policy goal by granting financial resources with policy conditions attached, under 
the threat of funding withdrawal in case of failure to comply with the said conditions. 
Public spending is rich in conditions. While all of them are essential to attain the goal of financial 
intervention and may attract funding cut-off, only some conditions behave as governance instruments 
– the so-called 'spending conditionality' in the EU or 'conditional spending' in the U.S. 
Various classifications have been elaborated to conceptually distinguish between conditions that put in 
place mere administrative or financial prudence requirements, on the one hand, and conditions 
designed to induce broader policy change, on the other hand.25 For the purpose of this contribution we 
shall refer to them as administrative and cross-cutting conditions.26 
The administrative conditions are necessary, intrinsic elements of a spending agreement. These usually 
refer to fiduciary guarantees, objectives of funding, selection rules, institutional arrangements, 
                                                     
23  EU High Level Group on Own Resources, FUTURE FINANCING OF THE EU: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
HIGH LEVEL GROUP ON OWN RESOURCES DECEMBER 2016, supra note 22; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 22. 
24  Daintith, Terence ‘The Techniques of Government’ in: THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION, JL Jowell & D Oliver (eds), 
1994, pp. 209–236. 
25  See on the distinction between classifying and coercive conditions in: CAPPALLI, supra note 12; Albert J. Rosenthal, 
Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STANFORD LAW REV. 1103–1164, 1114 (1987); WATTS, 
RELATIONS, AND STUDIES, supra note 15 at 13.  
26  WATTS, RELATIONS, AND STUDIES, supra note 15. 
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planning, supervision, reporting, evaluation or audit rules. These conditions are rarely contested and 
taken together, are seen as essential, necessary elements to ensure that the primary goal of spending is 
achieved – i.e. a highway.  
Cross-cutting conditions are distinguished from administrative conditions as they generally tend to 
have a less direct link to funding and go beyond the primary and immediate goal of spending. In this 
sense, cross-cutting conditions are an accessory (not necessary) element of spending, pursuing related, 
yet distinguishable policy objectives, which go beyond the primary goal of the spending intervention. 
For instance, a cross-cutting condition attached to highway funds may ask a state to adopt an 
environmental impact assessments statute or put in place a coherent strategy to support women auto-
mobility. In both cases the requirements pursue distinct cross-cutting policy goals – environmental 
protection and gender equality – which are not necessary to achieve the primary goal of funding (i.e. a 
highway), but are nevertheless successfully advanced through it. When requiring that states enforce 
and apply legislation on environmental impact assessments, spending internalises an additional policy 
goal of environmental protection. Similarly, by requiring that states adopt strategies to encourage 
women's equal access to and usage of cars, spending becomes a driver for gender equality policy. 
As underlined by Rosenthal, administrative and cross-cutting conditions often overlap.27 Take for 
instance a condition that requires state authorities managing public spending to be gender balanced. 
Such a condition has both administrative and cross-cutting elements. However, for the purpose of this 
contribution it is absolutely necessary to distinguish conceptually between the two, as our concern in 
the next sections lies essentially with the cross-cutting conditions.  
Based on the above, one may portray cross-cutting conditions as accessory policy requirements 
attached by the U.S. federal government and the EU to financial benefits offered to states or private 
recipients, that aim to achieve policy goals which could not have been achieved or would have been 
more difficult to achieve through direct regulation or policy making process.  
As a general rule, cross-cutting conditions attract funding withdrawal in case of poor compliance and 
exceptionally may attract additional financial incentives in case of good performance - we shall refer 
to them as negative and respectively, positive conditions.28 Conditions may also ask for compliance 
with a given conduct before or after the disbursement of funds - ex ante and ex post conditions.  
Cross-cutting conditions may have multiple governance functions. These may ask states to enforce 
predating but unenforced legal or policy requirements (enforcement function), to pass a law or regulate 
a certain conduct (regulatory function). Conditions may also seek to implement a new policy 
framework (policy implementing function) or mandate capacity building and institutional reform 
(structural function). Irrespective of the functions pursued, it is important to stress that in all instances 
cross-cutting conditions touch on a wide-array of social, economic, cultural and political issues and, if 
fully implemented, have the potential to crucially impact our societies, our economies and individual 
rights enjoyment on the ground. 29 
                                                     
27  Rosenthal, supra note 25. 
28  ELENA FIERRO & EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, THE EU’S APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONALITY IN PRACTICE 
(2001). 
29  JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN, IMPLEMENTATION: HOW GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN OAKLAND : OR, WHY 
IT’S AMAZING THAT FEDERAL PROGRAMS WORK AT ALL, THIS BEING A SAGA OF THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
ADMINISTRATION AS TOLD BY TWO SYMPATHETIC OBSERVERS WHO SEEK TO BUILD MORALS ON A FOUNDATION OF RUINED 
HOPES (3rd ed. ed. 1984). 
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The constitutional significance of spending conditions in the U.S. and the EU  
Cross-cutting conditions have been vividly discussed in the U.S. constitutional scholarship and enjoy 
an increasing interest in the EU academic and institutional circles. Two general approaches to cross-
cutting conditions may be identified in the U.S. and the EU: (1) a critical and (2) a functional one.  
In the U.S., the first string of legal scholarship raises concerns regarding the impact of conditional 
spending on the balance of powers between federal and state governments, on the one hand;30 and the 
protection of individual rights, on the other hand.31 In this context, cross-cutting conditions have been 
seen at the edge of constitutionality, characterized as "constitutionally permissible but not 
constitutionally required" tools.32 Other prominent scholars have argued that conditions are 
illegitimate and even unconstitutional attempts of the higher level of government to govern 'through 
the back door' of spending as opposed to the 'front door' of the legislative process.33 A particular close 
attention has been paid to cross-cutting conditions requiring goals that go beyond the explicitly 
enumerated powers of the federal government, which could not have been achieved in absence of 
spending.34 Similar concerns have been voiced in areas where the federal government has the power to 
regulate independently of spending, but nevertheless uses conditions to circumvent or avoid the often 
inconvenient political or legislative process.35 On a more profound note, conditional spending has 
been seen as a tool that fundamentally changed the face of U.S. dual federalism into a cooperative 
one36 and has helped rewrite the spirit of U.S. constitution without changing its letter.37 
Let us take the example of education and environmental policies to better illustrate the debate. The EU 
as well as the U.S. federal government do not generally have competence to decide on matters of 
education at state level. Yet, both the EU and the U.S. may successfully ask states receiving funding to 
adopt policies that influence education. This is done, for instance, by asking states to adopt active 
measures to reduce early school leaving,38 to put in place socially inclusive education systems or to 
observe specific education performance goals.39 Similarly, both the EU and the U.S. have the 
competence to adopt environmental policy and legislation.40 Yet, in some instances legislators may 
find it more appealing to advance, reinforce or detail specific environmental laws and policy 
                                                     
30  EDWARD SAMUEL CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT; A HISTORY OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY. 149–199 
(1934), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebookbatch.GEN_batch:20161108ccn00303966 (last visited Feb 6, 2017). 
31  Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. LAW REV. 1413–1506 (1989); William P. Marshall, 
Towards a Nonunifying Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions: The Example of the Religion Clauses, 26 SAN DIEGO 
LAW REV. 243–254 (1989). 
32  Larry Alexander, Understanding Constitutional Rights in a World of Optional Baselines, 26 SAN DIEGO LAW REV. 175–
188 (1989). 
33  LYNN A. BAKER, THE SPENDING POWER AND THE FEDERALIST REVIVAL (2001), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2672823 
(last visited Feb 13, 2017); Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending after “Lopez,” 95 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 1911–
1989, 1918–1919. 
34  Rosenthal, supra note 25; Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending as a Regulatory Device, 26 SAN DIEGO LAW 
REV. 277–288 (1989). 
35  BAKER, supra note 33. 
36  MICHAEL D. REAGAN, THE NEW FEDERALISM 13- (1972); CORWIN, supra note 30 at 149-. 
37  ACKERMAN, supra note 8. 
38  Regulation 1303/2013, Annex XI, Part I, point 10.1. 
39  Patrick Haney, Coercion by the Numbers: Conditional Spending Doctrine and the Future of Federal Education Spending 
Note, 64 CASE WEST. RESERVE LAW REV. 577–618, 590–601 (2013); Elizabeth K. Hinson, Mainstreaming Equality in 
Federal Budgeting: Addressing Educational Inequities with Regard to the States, 20 MICH. J. RACE LAW 377 (2014). 
40  TFEU, Art. 4 (2) e); US Constitution, Article I, section 8, Commerce clause. 
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requirements through spending intervention, as opposed to direct regulation.41 The use of cross-cutting 
conditions as a governance device may decisively shift the balance of power between the levels of 
government in a federal system or may de facto add to the competences of the federal government in 
areas not expressly delegated to it. 
The second, more modest string of U.S. constitutional literature sees conditional spending as an 
opportunity to uphold and advance individual rights and national-wide goals, such as free exercise of 
religion or environmental protection.42 It has also been argued that conditional spending may support 
efficient government, solve federal collective action problems, attain uniformity in a multilevel 
governance setting, promote innovation, foster economic efficiency, and adopt imminent solutions 
necessary in an ever deeper and more inter-dependent federal system - captured in Justice Cardozo's 
notorious words: "sink or swim together".43 
The EU law literature on spending conditionality is scarce, but similarly polarized. On the one hand, 
scholars question the opportunity of conditionality as a proxy enforcement mechanism for EU policies 
at the national level.44 On the other hand, conditionality is seen as a precious governance instrument to 
advance EU values and interests in areas where EU lacks sufficient powers, but is legitimately entitled 
to act.45 In this last prevailing view, that largely reflects the EU institutional vision of conditionality,46 
cross-cutting conditions are presented as revelatory EU governance solutions, meant to promote 
efficiency, strengthen institutions and correct conduct of undisciplined Member States that 
systematically fail to fully uphold the European laws, policies, values and the European economic 
rules.47 
Having in mind the above constitutional portrait of spending conditions and the broader debates 
surrounding them, the following sections shall briefly lay out their evolution and current standing in 
the U.S. and EU legal systems. The sections shall pay a particular attention to the constitutional basis 
and historical development of conditional spending and shall further inquire on their administrative 
implementation, enforcement and judicial review. 
                                                     
41  Johan F. M. Swinnen, The Political Economy of the 2014-2020 Common Agricultural policy: An Imperfect Storm 
(Bruxelles: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2015). See for instance on the EU's 2014 practice to reinforce its 
environmental goals through agricultural spending 'green payments' conditionality, at pp 16-19 infra. 
42  Kimberly Sayers-Fay, Conditional Federal Spending: A Back Door to Enhanced Free Exercise Protection, 88 CALIF. LAW 
REV. 1281–1322 (2000); Denis Binder, The Spending Clause as a Positive Source of Environmental Protection: A Primer 
Spending Clause Symposium, 4 CHAPMAN LAW REV. 147–162 (2001).  
43  Chi Chung, The limit of the federal spending power of the United States, 2002; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative 
Federalism and Co-Optation, 92 YALE LAW J. 1344–1348 (1983); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc. 294 U.S. 511 (1935), 
JUSTIA LAW 193, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/294/511/case.html (last visited Feb 14, 2017). Justice 
Cardozo's Opinion: "The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range. It 
was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that, in the long run, 
prosperity and salvation are in union, and not division." 
44  Roland Bieber & Francesco Maiani, Enhancing centralized enforcement of EU law: Pandora’s Toolbox?, 51 COMMON 
MARK. LAW REV. 1057–1092 (2014); Stijn Verhelst, Cohesion Policy and Sound Economic Governance: A Loveless 
Marriage,  POL. Q. INT. AFF. 113–126 (2014). 
45  Armin von Bogdandy, Systemic deficiency in the rule of law: What it is, what has been done, what can be done, 51 
COMMON MARK. LAW REV. 59–96 (2014). 
46  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE VALUE ADDED OF EX ANTE CONDITIONALITIES IN THE EUROPEAN STRUCTURAL AND 
INVESTMENT FUNDS (2017); Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council, The 
European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions Guidelines on the application of the 
measures linking effectiveness of the European Structural and Investment Funds to sound economic governance 
according to Article 23 of Regulation (EU) 1303/2013 COM (2014) 0494 final; Communication From The Commission 
To The European Parliament And The Council  Mid-term review/revision of the multiannual financial framework 2014-
2020: An EU budget focused on results Brussels, 14.9.2016 COM(2016) 603 final, (2016). 
47  Bogdandy, supra note 45; WERNER SCHROEDER, STRENGTHENING THE RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE: FROM A COMMON CONCEPT 
TO MECHANISMS OF IMPLEMENTATION 231193 (2016). 
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Comparative perspectives: the U.S. and the EU 
The U.S. conditional spending  
The U.S. federal government transfers about 600 bln US dollars in conditional grants annually at the 
state and local level,48 representing sixteen percent of the federal budget and a share of twenty percent 
of the overall State and local gross investments.49 About 80 percent of the above grants are transferred 
directly to state and local governments; a sum that constitutes three percent of the U.S. GDP.50 The 
U.S. federal grants are clustered around eight main spending areas: starting with the most generous 
spending items of healthcare (56%), social security (18%), education and transportation (11% each), 
followed by more modest allocations to regional development (2%), agriculture, energy and justice 
(1% each).51  
All federal grants disbursed to State and local governments are conditional, however, conditions 
depend on the grants' type and thematic area.52 The categorical grants (formula and project) are 
generally tailored for specific actions and tend to have the most conditions attached.53 Block grants are 
allocated to a broader thematic goal (i.e. healthcare) and are not limited to pre-determined projects, 
hence accompanying conditions tend to be more relaxed.54 Finally, revenue sharing grants tend to have 
the least conditions attached, however these have not been disbursed since 1984.55 
The access to U.S. federal grants is in principle optional. Federal grants are a conditional offer of the 
U.S. Congress (or conditional gift), which can be rejected by the State with no legal consequences. In 
practice however, States find it increasingly difficult to reject federal funds even if these may be tied 
to uncomfortable conditions.56 Consequently, even if not constitutionally required, States tend to be 
                                                     
48  Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2017, Historical Tables. 
Table 12.2. “Total Outlays for Grants to State and Local Governments, by Function and Group: 1940–2021.” Table 14.2. 
“Total Government Expenditures: 1948-2015.” available at: https://www.govinfo.gov/ 
content/pkg/BUDGET-2017-TAB/pdf/BUDGET-2017-TAB.pdf  
49  OMB, data for 2013-2015, Table 15–1. Trends In Federal Grants To State And Local Governments, 245, available at: 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2015-PER/pdf/BUDGET-2015-PER.pdf  
50 OMB, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2017, Historical Tables. Table 12.2. “Total Outlays for Grants 
to State and Local Governments, by Function and Group: 1940–2021.” Table 14.3. “Table 14.3—Total Government 
Expenditures As Percentages Of GDP: 1948–2015—Continued”, data extracted for the years 2005-2015, available at: 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2017-TAB/pdf/BUDGET-2017-TAB.pdf 
51  OMB, 2014 data, Table 12.2. “"Total Outlays for Grants to State and Local Governments, by Function and Group: 1940–
2021." 
52 ROBERT JAY DILGER, FEDERAL GRANTS TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 2–3 (2015); ELOISE PASACHOFF, AGENCY ENFORCEMENT OF SPENDING CLAUSE STATUTES: A 
DEFENSE OF THE FUNDING CUT-OFF 271–273 (2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2524477 (last visited Feb 27, 
2017); UNITED STATES. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CATEGORICAL GRANTS, THEIR ROLE 
AND DESIGN 233–268 (1978). 
53  JAY DILGER, supra note 52 at 4; UNITED STATES. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 
52 at 6–9.  
54  JAY DILGER, supra note 52; UNITED STATES. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 52 
at 6–9; STEVEN MAGUIRE, GENERAL REVENUE SHARING: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS.  
55  JAY DILGER, supra note 52 at 3–10. 
56  Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism’s Trojan Horse, 1988 SUPREME COURT REV. 85 
(1988); BAKER, supra note 33; Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power after NFIB V. Sebelius, 37 HARV. J. LAW PUBLIC 
POLICY 71 (2014). 
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increasingly involved in the legislative process of spending, often contributing in decisive ways to the 
final design and scope of federal spending programs.57 
2.1.1 Legal basis  
Conditional spending has its fountainhead in the spending clause of the U.S. Constitution that grants 
the federal Congress the power "to provide for [...] the general welfare" of the country.58 The U.S. 
Constitution is silent on the conditions of spending, which shape independently in grant statutes and 
are subsequently detailed in specific grant agreements.  
The evolution of conditional spending in the U.S. legal system is closely related to the debate on the 
scope of federal spending power. The debate goes back to the founding years of the U.S. federation 
and the intellectual dispute of the U.S. founding fathers Hamilton and Madison.59 The two held 
radically different views on the relationship between the federal spending power, on the one hand, and 
the enumerated federal legislative powers, on the other.60 While Madison fiercely believed that federal 
spending must be narrowly construed in subordination of the explicitly enumerated federal legislative 
powers. As such, Hamilton argued that spending should be read in autonomous terms form the 
legislative powers,61 allowing the federal government enough flexibility to support economic growth 
and to address the "exigencies" of the time.62 This debate on the reach of the spending power is as 
important today as it was two centuries ago. While the balance is currently on Hamilton's side, this 
state of art is far from settled, especially since the Supreme Court can in principle always reconsider 
its 'Hamiltonian' standing and limit its current broad reading of the U.S. federal spending power.63 
Evolution 
The evolution of conditional spending in the U.S. legal system knows four stages: development, 
experimentation, expansion and consolidation.  
The first development stage dates back to the 1882 Morril Act, which established one of the first 
categorical assistance programs.64 The program allocated land grants to state educational institutions 
and conditioned the latter to provide military instruction to the young people attending the 
establishment.65 Subsequently, the establishment of the federal income tax by the Sixteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1913, facilitated higher spending and consequently the 
development of numerous conditions of spending.66 However, the latter were largely administrative in 
nature and rarely prescribed for additional national policy requirements.67  
The second experimentation stage was triggered by the Great Depression of the 1930s and the follow 
up New Deal reforms which facilitated increased federal transfers to state and local governments.68 
                                                     
57  Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WILLIAM MARY LAW REV. 1549–1574 (2011); ABBE R. GLUCK, OUR 
[NATIONAL] FEDERALISM (2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2427109 (last visited Feb 8, 2017). 
58  US Constitution Article I, Section 8, states that: "The Congress shall have power to [...] provide for the [...] general 
welfare of the United States" 
59  For an excellent historical journey on the evolution of the US federal government power to spend, see: SKY, supra note 4. 
60  Id. 
61  ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON, JOHN JAY, 'THE FEDERALIST PAPERS' (1961). 
62  SKY, supra note 4 at 93–108. 
63  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius 567 U.S. (2012), supra note 6. 
64  UNITED STATES. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 52 at 15. 
65  Id. at 15. 
66  JAY DILGER, supra note 52 at 16–17. 
67  UNITED STATES. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 113 at 16–17. 
68  Id. at 17–18. 
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The most notorious conditions of the period remain the Davis-Bacon Act of the 1931 and the Hatch 
Act of 1940, establishing a wage floor for employees of federally funded programs and requiring that 
state administrators of federal grants refrain from partisan political activities, respectively.69 Both 
conditions have had a tremendous influence and have been continuously used up to the present days.70 
The start of the third expansion stage was brought by the revolutionary welfare and civil rights reforms 
of the 1960s.71 During the time, the number of cross-cutting conditions dramatically expanded, 
counting fifty nine national-wide conditions by 1980s.72 The conditions' thematic scope also knew an 
important expansion. As such, conditions were ingeniously designed to support the Civil Rights Acts 
of the 1960s and the subsequent legislation in the area of non-discrimination, inclusion of 
handicapped, alcohol and drug abuse prevention, environmental protection, economic advancement, 
health and human safety, minority participation, labor standards, including minimum wage 
requirements.73 The conditions above were supplemented by fund-specific conditions in each area of 
funding, such as the student and teacher performance conditions of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act.74 Other examples of thematic conditions in the area of transportation are the 
prohibition of highway banners (Highway Beautification Act of 1965) and a maximum driving speed 
of 55 miles per hour (Highway Energy Conservation Act of 1975).75 It is worth noting that the ex ante 
enforcement of the speed limit condition (55 mph) was designed to support the national policy goal of 
reducing fuel consumption during the 1970s oil crisis and managed to secure compliance in a record 
time of two months of twenty one states opposing the measure.76 
The fourth consolidation stage started in the 1980s and continues to the present days.77 During the 
period, we assist to a general consolidation of conditional spending practice, with little or no influence 
from the changing political preferences of the executive or legislative branches. As Posner showed, the 
use of conditions of spending is in itself a non-partisan phenomenon.78 While the substantive policy 
goals of conditions may change from conservative to progressive ends, the strategy of using 
conditional spending to induce state behavior in line with federal preferences was rarely questioned.79 
As such, in spite of Reagan administration's deregulation efforts in the 1980s, conditions did not 
decrease but, on the contrary, slightly increased in numbers.80 One famous condition enacted during 
the period was the National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984, that instructed the federal 
government to withhold about five per cent (now ten percent) of highway grants from states allowing 
possession or consumption of alcohol at a lower age than 21.81  
                                                     
69  Id. at 20. 
70  CAPPALLI, supra note 12 at 1201–1311. 
71  UNITED STATES. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 52 at 21–25. 
72  US EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 1 at 20–26. 
73  Id. at 20–26. 
74 These relate inter alia to English literacy, prohibition of drugs, teacher proficiency, technological advancement. see: 
PASACHOFF, supra note 52 at 613–614. 
75  US ACIR, REGULATORY FEDERALISM: POLICY, PRO- CESS, IMPACT AND REFORM 2. 
76  Id. at 15. 
77 US EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 1; UNITED STATES. 
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 52. 
78 ALICE M. RIVLIN, INTERGOVERNMENTAL MANAGEMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 299–300 (Timothy J. Conlan & Paul L. 
Posner eds., 2008), http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt6wphh3 (last visited Mar 3, 2017). 
79  Id. at 299–300. 
80 Paul Posner, 'Mandates. The Politics of Coercive Federalism', in: Id. at 288.; JAY DILGER, supra note 52 at 32; PAUL L. 
POSNER, THE POLITICS OF UNFUNDED MANDATES: WHITHER FEDERALISM? (1998); TIMOTHY J. CONLAN, FROM NEW 
FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM 143 (2010).  
81  The 1984 National Minimum Drinking Age Act, 23 U.S.C. § 158 
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In 1990s, during the Clinton administration, the conditions of spending were further consolidated, 
especially in the area of education. The administration's 'school performance' conditions were signed 
into law through Educate America Act of 1994 which subjected low performing schools receiving 
federal funding to a comprehensive set of education performance results and outcomes.82 The reform 
is believed to be a turning point in federalization of the U.S. education policy, further limiting the 
states' power in the area.83 
As a push back on the expanding power of the federal government, in the 1990s the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act was passed, prohibiting federal commands addressed to state governments 
without matching financial allocations.84 The act however did not manage to limit the reach of the 
federal spending power, as it explicitly exempts grant conditions from its scope of application.85  
In the 2000s the Bush administration continued the use of conditions, albeit with some simplification 
attempts.86 Major cross-cutting conditions of the period were established by No Child Left Behind Act 
which reformed the Clinton era 'student performance' requirements in primary and secondary 
education.87 The post-9/11 reform agenda facilitated the establishment of novel conditions of spending 
deployed through security and emergency preparedness directives.88 Additionally, the conditions on 
minimum work requirements for welfare aid recipients89 and those established by Help America Vote 
Act are worth mentioning.90  
As a novelty, conditions waivers and super-waivers for certain states and projects have been 
established in 2000s.91 Waivers were to strengthen state autonomy in federally financed policies and to 
accommodate state and local specificities.92 However, in the light of the elaborate pre-conditions states 
have to meet to benefit from a waiver, the power of the federal government remained strong, as federal 
agencies retain the last say in waiving or not the conditions of spending.93 
The Obama administration continued to actively design and deploy cross-cutting conditions to state 
and local level. The administration's signature conditions targeted the areas of education and 
healthcare. Conditions in education included a broader interpretation of Title IX non-discrimination 
conditions in education as to include transgender students94 and combat sexual assault on campus.95 In 
addition, project-tailored conditions for low performing schools were introduced through post-crisis 
                                                     
82  The Goals 2000: Educate America Act (P.L. 103-227) of March 31, 1994. 
83  Michael Heise, Goals 2000: Educate America Act: The Federalization and Legislation of Educational Policy, 63 
FORDHAM LAW REV. 345–382 (1994); Susan H. Fuhrman, Clinton’s Education Policy and Intergovernmental Relations 
in the 1990s, 24 PUBLIUS J. FED. 83–97 (1994). 
84  Public Law 104–4—MAR. 22, 1995 https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-104publ4/pdf/PLAW-104publ4.pdf  
85  Id.  
86  Paul Posner, The Politics of Coercive Federalism in the Bush Era, 37 PUBLIUS J. FED. 390–412 (2007). 
87  RIVLIN, supra note 78 at 296. 
88  Posner, supra note 146 at 397–400. 
89  Id. at 393–394.; JAY DILGER, supra note 52 at 36. 
90  Pub.L. 107–252 
91  The waivers had only a limited simplification impact, see: Posner, supra note 86 at 392; JAY DILGER, supra note 52 at 37. 
92  David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 265–346 (2013). 
93  Id. 
94 Joint guidance of the US Department of Justice and Education, 'Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Student' 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf See on implementa-tion 
evaluation Examples of Policies and Emerging Practices for Supporting Transgender Students (May 2016), available at: 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/850991/download  
95White House Task Force to Protect Students From Sexual Assault, report January 2014, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/report_0.pdf 
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'School Improvement Grants' and 'Race to the Top' programs.96 The healthcare conditions attached to 
Medicaid expansion program (commonly referred to as 'Obamacare' jointly with Affordable Care Act) 
were designed to assure a much more inclusive healthcare coverage, notably for disadvantaged and 
vulnerable groups.97 
The current Trump administration continues vesting conditions of spending in support of its 
governance program. As expected, the substantive scope of conditions has shifted from progressive to 
conservative policy goals, yet the use of conditions is actively continued. The conditions  of spending 
put forwards so far ask States and local authorities to cooperate on federal immigration enforcement 
policies, subject to funding cut-off in case of refusal.98 Similarly, conditions linked to the ban of 
transgender individuals enrolment into the U.S. Armed Services have been revised.99 Currently, the 
sexual assault on campuses policy conditions are under revision, potentially leading to funding cut-off 
for non compliant beneficiaries.100  
Administrative implementation and enforcement  
The U.S. record with conditional spending during the last century shows a mixed policy success. One 
the one hand, evidence shows that conditions have been crucial in attaining the aimed policy results 
when other instruments proved insufficient or inapt, as the examples of school desegregation in the 
1960s101 or nation-wide transportation regulations in the 1970s and 1980s show.102 On the other hand, 
numerous conditions have proved very difficult, especially in the first implementation years, such as 
the early examples of inclusion of children with disabilities in education,103 minority inclusion into 
labor market104 or the most recent education performance conditions for lagging behind schools.105 
The U.S. experience shows that the policy success of conditions is context dependent. The 
effectiveness of conditions depends on a wide net of closely interdependent social, economic, political, 
cultural, administrative and institutional factors and structures at all levels of government. In this 
sense, Posner usefully identifies four broad external factors likely to affect the outcome of conditions, 
                                                     
96  School improvement Grant (SIG) conditions came in packages depending on the reform the underperforming school opted 
for and included teaching and management staff replacement, standardised tests and student evaluations, adoption of 
Charter Schools regulations, longer school days. Ex post evaluation shows limited results of the funding initiative as a 
whole. See: U.S. Department of Education, School Improvement Grants: Implementation and Effectiveness, January 
2017, https://ies.ed.gov/ncee/pubs/20174013/pdf/20174013.pdf Race to the Top program was a competitive grant 
program addressed to States with good prior performance committing to additional ambitious conditions. See generally: 
https://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf  
97  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Public Law 111–148)  
98 Executive Order 13768 of January 25, 2017. BRIAN T. YEH, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE 
CONDITIONS ON GRANT FUNDS. 
99  The condition has its roots into the Solomon Amendment upheld by the Supreme Court in Rusnfeld v FAIR (2006) 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/547/47/ The amendment allows the suspension of funds to colleges and 
universities restricting military recruiting on their campuses even if the said opposition is based on non-discrimination 
concerns. 
100CNN, DEVOS ANNOUNCES REVIEW OF OBAMA-ERA SEXUAL ASSAULT GUIDANCE, 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/07/politics/betsy-devos-education-department-title-ix/index.html (last visited Oct 4, 2017). 
101  ACKERMAN, supra note 8 at 232–235. 
102  King, supra note 9. 
103  CAPPALLI, supra note 12. 
104  PRESSMAN, supra note 29. 
105  U.S. Department of Education, School Improvement Grants: Implementation and Effectiveness, January 2017, 
https://ies.ed.gov/ncee/pubs/20174013/pdf/20174013.pdf  
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these are: political cohesion at the federal level (1), coordination at state level and between states (2), 
federal-state congruence (3) and public participation (4).106  
Additionally, we notice that outcomes of conditions are decisively influenced by conditions intrinsic 
factors, such as conditions' initial design, planning and substantive scope. In this respect, conditions 
that have most often been cited as success examples, tend to prescribe for individual or one-act 
measures, such as: abolition of school segregation laws, adoption of 55 mph speed limit, adoption of 
minimum drinking age statues or selective military service registration of men upon college 
enrollment.107 On the contrary, conditions that proved difficult prescribed for broad, multiannual 
affirmative measures, often tailored to induce substantial change in human behavior and reform priory 
established social, economic, cultural, political or institutional structures, and even reform entire 
communities, as the challenging examples of inclusive regional development initiatives show.108  
Throughout time, conditions have been responsible for massive administrative hardship, that triggered 
continuous simplification and funding streamlining reforms.109 A first major simplification reform was 
initiated at end of 1970s110 and led to the adoption of Federal Assistance Reform Act in 1980.111 The 
latter contained a dedicated section on conditions reform and provided for detailed rules on uniform 
interpretation, application, institutional coordination and adjustment of conditions' budgetary costs.112 
Subsequent efforts of simplification, coordination and capacity building followed in 1999113 and 
2006.114 The latter reform was revived during the Obama administration, leading to the establishment 
of an Inter-Agency Council on Financial Assistance Reform in 2011115 which was tasked to assist the 
Office of Management and Budget to develop uniform guidance, training and metrics, including on 
conditions of spending.116 The reform culminated with the adoption of an uniform guidance Code of 
Federal Funding in 2014, establishing the general obligation on federal awarding agencies to ensure 
full and correct compliance with the conditions.117 The latter are to compile a clear and transparent list 
of conditions applicable to spending awards in their respective area of funding and dully inform the 
recipients on their obligation to comply with the requirements.118 Continuous assessment of current 
                                                     
106  RIVLIN, supra note 78 at 299. 
107  King, supra note 9 at 307. 
108  PRESSMAN, supra note 29. 
109 UNITED STATES. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 52; US EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT AND OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 1. 
110  Public Law 95-224, Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act (1977) 
111  96th Congress, Act S.878, https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/senate-bill/878?r=324 
112  CAPPALLI, supra note 12 at 11-7-11–22. 
113 The Federal Financial Assistance Management Improvement Act of 1999. See on implementation United States 
Government Accountability Office, Grants Management (2005) http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/246040.pdf  
114  Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act, Pub. L. No. 109-282, https://www.fsrs.gov ; Subsequent 
executive action: Executive Order 13563 of 2011 Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review and follow up policy 
action https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201100123/pdf/DCPD-201100123.pdf The initiative led to the 
establishment of Council on Financial Assistance Reform (COFAR) in 2011. 
115  OMB, Memorandum M-12-01, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2012/m-12-
01.pdf  
116  https://cfo.gov/cofar/ 
117  Office for Management and Budget, Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for 
Federal Awards, section 200.300: https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title02/ 
2cfr200_main_02.tpl  
118 See for instance the incredibly rich list of national statutory and policy conditions applicable to research funding: 
https://www.nsf.gov/bfa/dias/policy/fedrtc/appc_march17.pdf  
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spending practices is under way with a particular emphasis on relaxing recipient burden and increasing 
the efficiency of spending.119 
Regarding enforcement, the U.S. federal agencies enjoy a high level of discretion in enforcing 
conditions, largely endorsed by courts.120 As a general finding, conditions tend to be rarely enforced 
against states and more frequently enforced against private recipients.121 As Pasachoff shows, while 
funding withdrawal has been ordered on important occasions, conditions remain under-enforced 
compared to the overall cases of non-compliance.122 Four main arguments have been traditionally 
advanced to explain under-enforcement in case of States: the damage by ricochet to most needy 
private beneficiaries (1) the unconstitutional coercion of States (2) the pressure to spend money (3) 
and the complex inter-institutional politics of funding cuts (4).123 However, as Pasachoff convincingly 
argues, the above four arguments are difficult to defend. First, as cuts are most often ordered precisely 
against individuals, arguing that cutting-off funding in case of states would hurt individuals is at least 
incoherent if not contradictory.124 Second, in Pasachoff's view state sovereignty is reinforced not 
undermined by cuts in funds, which adds to states' accountability.125 Third, agencies have large 
discretion in deciding on the effective amount of cuts, which are most of the times modest and do not 
interfere with the budgetary execution process.126 Lastly, the argument that state political pressure 
always acts as a credible deterrent of cuts severely undermines the federal agencies' power within the 
overall spending construct.127  
Regardless of the arguments brought against or in favor of enforcement, for the moment, under-
enforcement remains a common finding in the U.S. in case of conditions addressed to States. 
Judicial review 
The U.S. Supreme Court has been invited to speak on the constitutionality of conditional spending on 
numerous occasions during the last century and until very recently recognized virtually unlimited 
discretion to Congress in designing spending and the conditions attached to it.128 
The start of the doctrine was marked by the Butler case (1936)129 whereby the Court embraced the 
Hamiltonian view of federal spending and endorsed its autonomy vis-a-vis other federal powers.130 
                                                     
119  See generally COFAR website: https://cfo.gov/cofar/ 
120  See generally, Barron and Rakoff, supra note 92 at 273–274. 
121 PASACHOFF, supra note 52; STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF TITLE VI OF THE 
1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 294–295 (1995). (observing the reluctance of administrations to order spending cut-off in the 
case of civil rights act conditions and the broader factors contributing to this sate of art) 
122  PASACHOFF, supra note 52 at 253–254. 
123  PASACHOFF, supra note 52. 
124  Id. section II.A 
125  Id. section II. B 
126  Id. section II. C 
127  Id. at 254–255. 
128SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, SPENDING CLAUSE LITIGATION IN THE ROBERTS COURT (2008), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1302086 (last visited Apr 3, 2017); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Viva Conditional Federal 
Spending, 37 HARV. J. LAW PUBLIC POLICY 93 (2014); Mark Tushnet, Judicial Review of Legislation,  (2005), 
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199248179.001.0001/oxfordhb-97801992 
48179-e-009 (last visited Jan 25, 2017); Rosenthal, supra note 25; Baker, supra note 56; Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: 
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. LAW REV. (1988); Sullivan, supra note 
31. 
129  United States v. Butler 297 U.S. 1 (1936), JUSTIA LAW, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/297/1/case.html (last 
visited Feb 17, 2017). 
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Subsequently, in Steward Machine v Davies (1937)131 and Oklahoma (1947) cases the Court 
confirmed the ability of the Congress to set the conditions of spending binding on the states, thus 
affirming the constitutionality of spending conditions.132 In the next decades, the Court attempted to 
set a number of limits on the spending power.133 These have been brought together under the Dole 
case (1987) doctrine which still embodies the Court's benchmark test on constitutionality of 
conditional spending.134 To pass the Dole test conditions must meet four cumulative requirements: 
these must advance "general welfare" (1),135 must be expressed "unambiguously" (2),136 must be 
germane to the federal interests in the spending program (3) and must not violate any other 
constitutional provision (4), here comprised the unconstitutional coercion of states137 and the 
constitutional rights of individuals.138  
Even if the Dole test seems to substantially limit the federal spending power, scholars tend to agree 
that Dole doctrine has hardly been able to meaningfully constrain the federal government conditional 
spending power.139 In the years to come, the Court applied a closer scrutiny test in cases involving 
individual rights, however the States claiming intrusive conditional spending coercion from federal 
level did not enjoy the same scrutiny.140 As Bagenstos shows, the "general welfare" criterion has been 
interpreted by the Court in Hamiltonian broad terms (1), the clear and unambiguous contractual notice 
of conditions has been easily fulfilled by Congress (2) and the conditions' germaneness requirement 
has not been much of a constraint so long as the federal government is free to set the objectives of 
spending in the first place (3).141 With regards to the fourth state coercion criterion (4), when states 
sovereignty and autonomy arguments were raised, the Court seemed to admit since mid-1900s that 
where conditions would reach a point at which financial incentives exert a high coercion on States 
these may be found unconstitutional.142 However, only in 2012, in NFIB v Sebelius case (Obamacare), 
the Court found that a condition exerted unconstitutional coercion on States, by threatening to 
withdraw all prior and future federal health support if a state does not accept the new program 
conditions.143 The Court found that such a condition did not leave the State a meaningful option to 
accept or reject the grant, but was rather a "gun to the head".144 Yet the Court refused to define the 
(Contd.)                                                                  
130  Rosenthal, supra note 34 at 277. 
131Steward Mach. Co. v. Collector 301 U.S. 548 (1937), JUSTIA LAW, https://supreme.justia.com/ 
cases/federal/us/301/548/case.html (last visited Feb 13, 2017). 
132Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm’n 330 U.S. 127 (1947), JUSTIA LAW, 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/330/127/case.html (last visited Feb 13, 2017). 
133Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman 465 U.S. 89 (1984), JUSTIA LAW, https://supreme.justia.com/ 
cases/federal/us/465/89/case.html (last visited Apr 5, 2017); BAGENSTOS, supra note 128 at 393–409. 
134  South Dakota v. Dole 483 U.S. 203 (1987), JUSTIA LAW, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/483/203/ (last visited 
Feb 13, 2017). 
135  United States v. Butler 297 U.S. 1 (1936), supra note 129; Steward Mach. Co. v. Collector 301 U.S. 548 (1937), supra 
note 131. 
136  Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman 465 U.S. 89 (1984), supra note 133. 
137  Steward Mach. Co. v. Collector 301 U.S. 548 (1937), supra note 131. 
138  South Dakota v. Dole 483 U.S. 203 (1987), supra note 134. 
139  BAGENSTOS, supra note 128. 
140  Epstein, supra note 128. 
141  BAGENSTOS, supra note 128. 
142  Steward Mach. Co. v. Collector 301 U.S. 548 (1937), supra note 131 at 590; South Dakota v. Dole 483 U.S. 203 (1987), 
supra note 134. 
143  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius 567 U.S. ___ (2012), supra note 6. 
144  Id. "In this case, the financial “inducement” Congress has chosen is much more than “relatively mild encouragement”—it 
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baselines of unconstitutional coercion through conditional spending, stating only that: "[...] wherever 
that line may be, [the] statute [was] surely beyond it."145 
Whilst one may not be certain about the exact implications of Obamacare case, scholarly debates 
suggest once again that these are most likely less significant than thought.146 This is so, because first, 
the Court avoided to establish clear baselines for its coercion doctrine147 and second, because it leaves 
scope for multiple 'workarounds' Congress can usefully explore to design future funding conditions.148 
Overall, the case law above shows that the Court finds itself highly constrained in drawing rigid 
doctrinal limits on conditional spending. When the Court does nevertheless intervene, the changes it 
introduces are incremental and leave a large discretion to the legislative and executive branches. In 
this sense, it is worth recalling that it took the Court about one century to adopt a standing on the 
spending power (Butler case, 1936), an additional half a century to crystalize a set of initial doctrinal 
limits on conditions of spending (Dole case, 1987) and other two decades to enforce a first limit on 
conditions addressing states (Obamacare case, 2012). 
EU spending conditionality 
The EU spending is planned on a multiannual basis149 and is capped annually at 1,2 per cent of 
Member States' GDP,150 that represents about 150 bln EUR yearly in the current 2014-2020 financial 
framework.151 EU disburses about 80 percent of its budget directly to Member States 152 in the form of 
conditional grants (EU Funds) managed by Member States administrations in close cooperation with 
and under the close supervision of the EU executive (the European Commission).153 EU Funds are 
clustered around four main spending areas: direct and structural agricultural aid (38%), social, regional 
(Contd.)                                                                  
the State.” 42 U. S. C. §1396c. A State that opts out of the Affordable Care Act’s expansion in health care coverage thus 
stands to lose not merely “a relatively small percentage” of its existing Medicaid funding, but all of it." 
145  Id. 
146  Taylor Bates & Tharuni Jayaraman, NFIB v. Sebelius: A Potential Shift in the Doctrine of Conditional Spending” 
(Briefing Paper No. 55),  HARV. LAW SCH. BRIEF. PAP. FED. BUDG. POLICY (2015); Bagenstos, supra note 128; Eloise 
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and-the-new-coercion-doctrine; ELOISE PASACHOFF, CONDITIONAL SPENDING AFTER NFIB V. SEBELIUS: THE EXAMPLE OF 
FEDERAL EDUCATION LAW (2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2166933 (last visited Apr 3, 2017); Erin Ryan, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AFTER SEBELIUS: WILL THE COURT’S NEW SPENDING POWER LIMITS AFFECT ENVIRONMENTAL 
STATE-FEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS? (2013), http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Ryan-_After_Sebelius.pdf. 
147  Several scholars have tried to remedy for the Court's silence. See: Mitchell N. Berman, Conditional Spending and the 
(General) Conditional Offer Puzzle, PENN LAW LEG. SCHOLARSH. REPOS. (2013); SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, THE ANTI-
LEVERAGING PRINCIPLE AND THE SPENDING CLAUSE AFTER NFIB (2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2128977 (last 
visited Oct 8, 2015). 
148  Bates and Jayaraman, supra note 146 at 31–40. 
149  TFEU, Art. 312. 
150  Council Decision of 7 June 2007 2007/436/EC, Euratom on the system of the European Communities’ own resources, OJ 
L 163, 23.6.2007, Art. 3 (1). 
151 Council Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 1311/2013 of 2 December 2013 laying down the multiannual financial 
framework for the years 2014-2020, Annex I. See also: The Multiannual financial framework 2014–2020 and EU budget 
2014 The figures, . 
152  The EU budget is shaped around seven main items of expenditure. In the 2014-2020 financial period, the largest EU 
spending envelope goes to direct and structural agricultural aid (38% of EU budget), followed by: economic, social and 
territorial cohesion aid for less developed regions and strategic investment (34%); EU-wide infrastructure, research and 
cultural projects (13%); external relations (6%); home affairs (2 %), fisheries (1%) and running costs (6%); See generally 
on EU budget planning and implementation: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/financialreport/ 
2015/lib/financial_report_2015_en.pdf. 
153  regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the 
financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, 58–59. 
Viorica Viță 
16 Department of Law Working Papers 
and economic cohesion (34 %), home affairs (2%) and fisheries (1%).154 It is precisely in these areas 
of spending that conditionality first shaped and substantially expanded during the 2014-2020 financial 
period.155 
Here, one must note that EU budget expenditure is limited when compared the overall EU-28 domestic 
government expenditure as a share of the EU-28 GDP (1,2 per cent compared to 47 per cent).156 
Nevertheless, EU spending is in no way of marginal importance to Member States. As opposed to 
Member States' expenditure which is largely dedicated to running costs and welfare spending, EU 
Funds are mainly allocated to long term capital expenditure and constitute an important source for 
domestic investment.157 In the last financial period (2007-2013), EU cohesion spending alone 
constituted about 20 percent of the total domestic capital investment, with particularly high shares in at 
least thirteen Member States.158  
These figures show that EU spending power even if considerably lower than the Member States' one 
constitutes an important financial source for domestic economies. Hence, the conditions attached to 
EU spending may credibly influence state conduct, with a particular high force in about half of EU 
Member States. 
Legal basis  
EU spending conditionality finds its source in the EU spending power. However, the EU treaties 
contain no explicit rule on conditions attached to spending. Pursuant to Article 317 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), the Commission implements the EU budget under her own 
responsibility, in close cooperation with Member States according to the rules of funding regulations 
adopted by the EU legislators (the EU Council and the European Parliament). It is in these statutory 
rules of spending that conditions find their primary source. The rules governing spending conditions 
are adopted jointly by the EU legislators (the directly elected European Parliament and the Council 
formed by representatives of states) on a proposal from the EU executive (the European Commission) 
on a multiannual basis.159 This means that conditions are first designed by the Commission, but their 
ultimate scope is likely to change during legislative negotiations to accommodate the Commission's 
progressive vision with the states' national interests and the parliament's citizen-centered position.160 
Subsequently, most conditions are negotiated between the Commission and the Member States during 
the planning stage and are ultimately implemented by Member States' administrations, acting under 
the close supervision of the Commission.  
Therefore, in the EU legal system, the emergence, implementation and ultimately enforcement of a 
given conditionality must be understood departing from the dynamics of the above legal and 
                                                     
154  The Multiannual financial framework 2014–2020 and EU budget 2014 The figures, supra note 49. 
155  See, pp 16-19 infra. 
156Eurostat, domestic expenditure by function, 2015 data, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/ 
index.php/Government_expenditure_by_function_–_COFOG#General_government_expenditure_by_function 
157  JORGE NÚÑEZ FERRER & MONI KATARIVAS, WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF THE EU BUDGET: DRIVING FORCE OR DROP IN THE 
OCEAN?  NO. 86 / APRIL 2014. 
158  Id. EU Funds share of national capital expenditure: Hungary 68.3%, Estonia 62,4%, Slovakia 59%, Lithuania 58.3%, 
Malta 49.3%, Bulgaria 42,7%, Latvia 41,2%, Poland 35.5%, Czech Republic 31,7%, Romania 27.3%, Greece 26,3%, 
Slovenia 25.4%, Portugal 22,4%. See also the last figures for 2016 in: Court of Auditors, 2016 Audit in brief, p. 16, 
http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/auditinbrief-2016/auditinbrief-2016-EN.pdf 
159  TFEU, Art. 322. 
160  The European Commission and the Court of Justice of the EU have been traditionally the drivers of EU integration, with 
the European Parliament in a supportive role and the Member States as gate-keepers of national sovereignty. See in 
detail: MARK A. POLLACK, THE ENGINES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: DELEGATION, AGENCY, AND AGENDA SETTING IN 
THE EU (2003). 
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administrative process, characterized by a continuous push and pull between the EU and Member 
States. 
Evolution 
Until recently, spending conditionality has not been a usual presence in the EU internal policies. 
Traditionally, conditionality has been a tool of EU external policy, where it first shaped and 
prosperously developed since the late 1970s.161 
Internally, the evolution of spending conditionality knows three stages: development, experimentation 
and expansion.  
The development stage started in the mid-1990s, upon the establishment of the Cohesion Fund.162 The 
fund was to prepare catching up states (then: Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal) for the 
establishment of the single Euro currency area in exchange of compliance with a set of 
macroeconomic convergence rules established by the Treaty of Maastricht – the macroeconomic 
conditionality.163   
In the 2000s, the experimentation stage followed. Over the decade isolated cross-cutting conditions 
continued to shape independently in EU structural, agricultural and fisheries funds legal frameworks. 
The conditions developed in an uncoordinated manner, being interpreted, applied and enforced in their 
own area of spending. As such, the EU social and regional development funds were endowed with a 
EU law infringement conditionality, which allowed the Commission to suspend funding if a state was 
suspected for breach of EU law.164 The agricultural funds included an important number of statutory 
and policy conditionalities requiring farmers to comply with certain minimum environmental 
conditions – the so-called ‘cross-compliance rules’ since the mid 2000s.165 As well, the fisheries fund 
developed its own conditionalities aimed at reinforcing the European Common Fisheries Policy 
provisions through spending.166  
                                                     
161  FIERRO, supra note 28; LORAND BARTELS, HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONALITY IN THE EU’S INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
(2005), http://www.oxfordscholarship.com.ezproxy.eui.eu/view/10.1093/ 
acprof:oso/9780199277193.001.0001/acprof-9780199277193 (last visited Jan 23, 2014); LORAND BARTELS, THE 
APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONALITY IN THE EU’S BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND OTHER TRADE 
ARRANGEMENTS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES INTERNATIONAL TRADE EN STUDY NOVEMBER (2008), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studies.html. 
162  Council Regulation (EC) No 1164/94, OJ 1994 L 130, Art. 2 and Art. 6. 
163  Treaty of Maastricht, Article 104c. Currently Articles 120-126 TFEU, and the subsequent conditionality packages 
adopted pursuant to Art. 121(2) Council recommendations. 
164  Council Regulation EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds, Art. 
32(3) f) as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the 
European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 1260/1999, Art. 86 (1)d), 89(1)-(2). 
165  Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 OJ L 270/2003, Article 2 and Annex III. The ‘Cross-Compliance’ conditionality system is 
split in two conditionality groups. On the one hand, farmers receiving aid are obliged to comply with a list of EU law 
statutory requirements (SMRs). On the other hand, they have to ensure that all agricultural land respects ‘good 
agricultural and environmental conditions’ in line with a set of European good practice standards. The failure to comply 
with conditions entailed reductions or exclusion from agricultural funds, depending on the severity of infringement. If the 
Commission finds that Member States failed to impose corrections on farmers, it refuses payments to Member States in 
the same amount.  
166  Regulation (EC) 2371/2002, Art.16, sending to Art. 11, 13, 15 therein and the provisions of the Council Regulation (EC) 
No 2792/1999. Member States  had to comply with a set of ex post negative conditionalities on: adjustment of fishing 
fleets capacity, fleet entry and exit management, establishment and management of fishing registers, timely submission 
of information necessary for drawing the country-specific Multiannual Guidance Programmes on fisheries at the EU 
level. 
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As of 2014, the current, expansion phase started.167 The expansion phase came in a post-2008 
economic crisis context, at a time when eight EU Member States faced heavy bail-out financial 
assistance conditionality packages largely implemented outside the EU treaty framework,168 and 
subsequently internalized in the internal EU economic governance process through the European 
Semester surveillance mechanism.169 It also comes at a time when EU experienced a deeper 
constitutional crisis, expressed by the systemic failure of certain Member States to follow key EU 
policies, give effect to EU legislation and uphold its founding values.170 These developments have 
stirred a generalized discourse of conditionality, better governance and efficiency of spending,171 
promoted by the 'EU North' and reluctantly accepted by the 'EU South'; a discourse that ultimately 
materialized in a massive expansion of conditionality in the 2014-2020 budgetary period.172 
In the aftermath of 2014, EU funds allocated to social, regional development, cohesion, fisheries and 
the rural development pillar of agricultural spending (jointly, the European Structural and Investment 
Funds, representing about 45% of EU budget) are linked to a comprehensive set of forty-three ex 
ante173 and ten macro-economic conditionalities174 plus one general EU law compliance 
conditionality.175 Under the new rules, the ex-ante conditions ask Member States to comply before the 
start of funding with detailed EU law, policy and structural requirements,176 whereas the macro-
economic conditions monitor continuous compliance with the EU economic governance 
                                                     
167  For a comprehensive mapping of the current EU spending conditionality see, Viorica Viţă, Revisiting the Dominant 
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170 The EU in its most serious crisis ever (and that’s not the Euro crisis), VERFASSUNGSBLOG, 
http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/the-eu-in-its-most-serious-crisis-ever-and-thats-not-the-euro-crisis-2/ (last visited Mar 
23, 2015); J. H. H. Weiler, Europe in Crisis - On “Political Messianism”, “Legitimacy” and the “Rule of Law,”  SINGAP. 
J. LEG. STUD. 248–268 (2012); Bogdandy, supra note 45; European Commission, MANAGING THE REFUGEE CRISIS: 
OPERATIONAL AND BUDGETARY MEASURES UNDER THE EUROPEAN AGENDA ON MIGRATION 11 (2015). 
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172 Negotiations of the 2014-2020 budgetary framework split the EU Member States wearing the hats of Council 
representatives in two groups: 'Friends of better spending' - led by Germany and supported the Commission; and 'Friends 
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173  Regulation 1303/2013, Art. 19, Annex XI. 
174  Regulation 1303/2013, Arts. 22-23 
175  Regulation 1303/2013, Arts. 43 
176  Regulation 1303/2013, Art. 19, Annex XI. Conditions cover a wide thematic scope, running from: non-discrimination, 
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recommendations, under the sanction of funding suspension.177 Moreover, at all times, all funding 
must comply with applicable EU law rules.178  
In addition, specific conditionalities have shaped in separate thematic areas of spending. As such, in 
2014-2020, farmers accessing agricultural funds are subject to new 'green' conditionality, that 
complement the prior cross-compliance system.179 Fisheries Fund is conditioned on full respect of 
multiple Common Fisheries Policy rules, before and after the release of funding, for both Member 
States and private beneficiaries.180 Home Affairs Funds are conditioned ex ante on observance of 
Schengen rules181 and ex post on compliance with EU law and human rights standards.182 
These conditions bring a substantial policy load to EU budget, in an attempt to make EU spending 
increasingly relevant to the broader EU governance process.183 Conditions know a rise in numbers, 
types, procedural design, thematic reach and functional use, especially in EU policy areas where 
progress proved difficult or achieved only a limited success.184 A closer look into the policy areas 
promoted by conditions shows that each condition is instrumental in addressing particular EU general 
or state-specific policy interests such as: advancement of EU novel policy objectives,185 maintenance 
of existing status-quo,186 policy implementation, enforcement of EU laws and policies, administrative 
capacity building or institutional reform.187  
The conditions above coerce largely Member States, with the exception of agricultural and fisheries 
payments where conditions are also addressed to private recipients. However even in the latter case, 
Member States are responsible to set appropriate legal frameworks, monitor compliance and enforce 
the conditions on private beneficiaries, being subsequently monitored by and financially liable to the 
Commission for failure to do so.188  
                                                     
177  Regulation 1303/2013, Arts. 22-23 
178  Regulation 1303/2013, Art. 43 
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182  Regulation (EU) 513/2014 art. 3 (5), Regulation (EU) 515/2014, art. 3 (4), Regulation (EU) 516/2014, art. 3(1) and Art. 
19(2), OJ L 150/2014. 
183  A line of reasoning which is more evident in the recent Commission communications: European Commission, INVESTING 
IN JOBS AND GROWTH - MAXIMISING THE CONTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN STRUCTURAL AND INVESTMENT FUNDS, BRUSSELS, 
COM(2015) 639 FINAL (2015). 
184  The deep failure of the common fisheries policy is a particularly telling example in this sense. See: Emily Self, Who 
Speaks for the Fish: The Tragedy of Europe’s Common Fisheries Policy Notes, 48 VANDERBILT J. TRANSNATL. LAW [i]-
608 (2015); COURT OF AUDITORS, SPECIAL REPORT NO 12/2011. HAVE EU MEASURES CONTRIBUTED TO ADAPTING THE 
CAPACITY OF THE FISHING FLEETS TO AVAILABLE FISHING OPPORTUNITIES? (2011). 
185  For instance, the agricultural policy 'green payment' conditionality, see note 179 supra. 
186  Schengen and human rights conditions that aim to uphold the EU border acquis and human rights status quo. 
187  Fisheries and macro-economic conditionalities, see notes 174, 180 supra. 
188  In practice the Commission applies corrections or refuses payments to Member States in breach of cross-cutting 
conditions.  
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Administrative implementation and enforcement 
The responsibility to monitor the implementation and enforce the conditions falls in the vast majority 
of cases on the Commission and its responsible executive agencies (Directorate-Generals). 
Exceptionally, in case of macroeconomic conditions, enforcement requires the approval of the Council 
to order suspension and of the European Parliament to allocate additional benefits.189 The conditions 
addressed to private beneficiaries are enforced by Member States under the supervision of the 
Commission.  
Regarding implementation, first data shows that the vast majority of ex ante conditionalities have been 
fully complied with by mid-2016.190 At the same time, one should mention that the post-2014 
conditionality expansion has brought an enormous administrative burden both at the EU and at the 
Member States level.191 The often tangled rules governing the conditions, coupled with the complex 
rules on spending and the broader EU and national policy frameworks made implementation a much 
more heavier enterprise than initially anticipated.192 This is especially true in the case of ex ante 
conditionalities, which must be fulfilled before spending starts and often demand comprehensive 
affirmative actions.193 In result, two negative consequences have been observed. First, conditions, 
amongst other factors, have contributed to important spending delays in the current financial 
framework.194 Second, while the vast majority of ex ante conditionalities have been complied with in a 
record time,195 in many instances conditions have been interpreted and implemented as formal check 
lists, with only marginal substantive policy outputs.196 Additionally, there is evidence of overlap and 
divergent interpretation of conditions throughout the responsible units of the Commission in charge of 
thematic funds.197 Evaluators have also detected inaccurate reporting by Member States on the 
applicability or fulfilment of certain conditions.198 
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197  A good example in this sense is the divergent application of three equal opportunities conditions (general ex ante 
conditionalities in the area of gender equality, non-discrimination, disability) of the European Structural and Investment 
Funds. Our examination of the programming documents shows that the Commission's directorates for employment (DG 
EMPL) and agriculture (DG AGRI) have strongly required the observance of all equality conditions. On the contrary the 
conditions are not always present in regional development programs and are completely excluded from fisheries: Finding 
based on the analysis of the EAFRD and ESF national programmes, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rural-
development-2014-2020/country-files/index_en.htm and http://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId=576&langId=en; EC, 
Draft Guidance, EMFF Specific Ex-Ante Conditionalities, Version 3 (7 March 2014), p. 12, available at: 
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Regarding enforcement, conditions tend to be rarely formally enforced against Member States,199 but 
frequently enforced against private recipients.200 In the case of the latter, evaluations of the cross-
compliance environmental conditionality attached to agricultural funds show that the system is well 
functioning, checks are carried out regularly and funds are withdrawn. 201 In subsidiary, where States 
fail to cut funds, Commission may apply correction or refuse payments - a practice regularly endorsed 
by the EU courts.202 
Contrary to conditions addressed to private beneficiaries, conditions addressed to the Member States 
are rarely enforced. In case of Member States the Commission traditionally enjoys a large discretion 
and therefore, in cases of non-compliance, a dialogue culture is generally favoured.203  
Even if formal enforcement is rare, it is interesting to note that informal enforcement tools have been 
de facto institutionalized in practice. As such, in numerous cases, Member States do not claim 
payments until the conditions are in place - the so-called 'self-suspension' mechanism.204 The 
mechanism allows states to avoid politically uncomfortable public suspensions of funds and is 
accepted by the Commission against the promise of future compliance.205 As we shall argue below 
such informal mechanisms may raise important legal concerns.206 
Judicial review 
The EU Court of Justice may rule on conditions during the judicial control of EU legislative acts or 
during the control of Commission's (administrative or quasi-legislative) acts. 
The Court of Justice of the EU has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of conditions with regards to 
Member States. Hence, contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court, the EU Court has not yet assessed the 
conformity of cross-cutting conditions with EU treaties and did not examine the question of whether 
the EU may use its spending to encourage acts otherwise outside the EU conferred powers.  
The Court did however review the constitutionality of conditions limiting individual fundamental 
rights and stuck them down when these were not consistent with the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.207  
                                                     
199  Interviews, Brussels, 5-6 July, 2016. In prior financial periods the macroeconomic conditionality have been enforced only 
once against Hungary; the infringement conditionality was enforced once against Italy; the home affairs funds human 
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200  Alliance Environnement, Evaluation of the application of cross compliance as foreseen under Regulation 1782/2003, 
Prepared for European Commission, DG Agriculture, Executive Summary, 26/07/2007, pp.5-6. In case of fisheries see: 
Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing, (entered in force from 2010), OJ L 286/2008, Art.40(3). 
201 Id. 
202 The effectiveness of conditionality addressed to individuals remains however questionable. See: COURT OF AUDITORS, 
SPECIAL REPORT 26/2016. MAKING CROSS‑COMPLIANCE MORE EFFECTIVE AND ACHIEVING SIMPLIFICATION REMAINS 
CHALLENGING; COURT OF AUDITORS, IS CROSS COMPLIANCE AN EFFECTIVE POLICY? (2008). 
203  Interviews, Brussels, 5-6 July, 2016. 
204  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 190. 
205  Interviews, Brussels, 5-6 July, 2016. 
206  See p.34 infra. 
207  Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Judgement of 9 November 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, Volker und Markus Schecke 
GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen (Volker), ECR I-11063, (holding that the condition to publicly publish the data of 
individual farmers went against the right to data protection as enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights); Case 
C-401/11 Judgement of 11 April 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:223 Blanka Soukupová v Ministerstvo zemědělství 
(Soukupová), nyr, paras. 28-29, (holding that a qualifying condition of spending in support of early retirement in the 
agricultural sector did not allow for retirement age differences between women and men, and prohibited further 
differences between women based on the number of children raised). 
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The EU Court has also reviewed on multiple occasions the validity of Commission decisions enforcing 
spending conditionality against states and granted in all the cases a broad discretion to the 
Commission, first in deciding on the existence of a conditionality breach and second on the effective 
amount of cuts.208 The vast majority of these cases deal with procedural rules of spending 
enforcement, however we have been able to identify one judgment that dealt in a substantive manner 
with a conditionality prohibiting payments to a state in breach of EU law.209 In Italy v Commission, the 
Court upheld the Commission's discretion and held that the Commission could refuse payments if a 
state is investigated for a breach of EU law,210 so long as a 'sufficiently direct link' may be identified 
between the breach of law and the spending measure in question.211 In establishing the 'sufficiently 
direct link' test, the Court adopted a broad interpretation of the term 'measure', rejecting Italy's claims 
that the infringement procedure and the financed 'measure' were not related.212  
Since the Court has not yet reviewed reviewed the constitutionality of conditionality addressed to 
Member States in the light of the EU treaties, to date, the benchmark test to assess the legality of 
conditions remains the 'sufficiently direct link' doctrine. The latter leaves a large scope of discretion 
both to the EU legislators in designing conditionality and to the Commission in enforcing it. 
Similarities and differences 
Similarities 
The comparative analysis of conditional spending in the U.S. and EU shows that the two systems have 
much more in common than one could have initially presumed.  
No explicit constitutional consecration 
Firstly, we notice that in both systems cross-cutting conditions have their fountainhead in the 
constitutional spending power.213 Yet, conditions know no express constitutional consecration neither 
in the EU founding treaties, nor in the U.S. Constitution. They shape as statutory spending rules 
adopted by the legislative branches and influenced to a great extent by the executives during the 
legislative process, but most notably during their actual implementation and enforcement.214  
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In both legal systems the conditions are vested by the higher level of government on state 
constituencies and private recipients of funds. States nevertheless play an important role in the 
process. First, states are central and often decisive actors in the initial design and adoption of 
conditions. 215 Second, the states have an important say on conditions as they have an important 
discretion in choosing the areas of spending and subsequently negotiate the specific terms of financial 
intervention.216 Lastly, and most importantly, states have a pivotal role in the effective implementation 
and actual application of conditions in each spending area.217 
Conditionality - a universal governance device  
The comparative study shows that conditionality is a virtually universal governance device, highly 
flexible and capable of remaining conceptually intact while transcending the boundaries of various 
policies and even legal systems. Both in the EU and the U.S. systems conditions present remarkable 
similarities in conceptual design and functional use. In both systems conditions shape as ex ante or ex 
post requirements of spending that pursue a federal policy goal and may lead to withdrawal of funds in 
case of non-compliance or to additional benefits in case of good compliance (negative and positive 
conditions). Through conditions, the EU as well as the U.S. federal governments bring additional 
policy objectives under the umbrella of spending, in many instances advancing what may not be 
achieved or may be more difficult to achieve through direct legislative and policy making 
procedures.218 The use of conditions is wide-spread throughout various policy areas, as: education, 
research, agriculture, home affairs, transparency, public health, environment et al. Conditions are 
ingeniously designed to help advance new policies, enforce old ones, regulate or encourage legislation 
and tackle institutional reforms using the leverage of budgets. Moreover, especially the U.S. example 
shows that conditions have high resilience over time, being almost immune to political change and 
highly adaptable to partisan politics.219 
Administrative under-enforcement and weak form judicial review 
Beyond these highly interesting findings on the nature of conditions, our main findings rest on the 
tool's administrative (under-)enforcement and (weak form) judicial review in both the EU and the U.S. 
legal systems. 
Administrative under-enforcement against States 
The comparative study shows that administrative under-enforcement is very likely, and whilst under-
enforcement tends to be generalized, the findings show that conditions tend to be more often enforced 
in case of private beneficiaries and are only very rarely enforced in the case of states governments.220 
As mentioned in section 2 above, conditions are rarely enforced in the U.S. In this sense, we recall that 
Pasachoff identified four usual suspects blamed for the under-enforcement phenomenon in the U.S.221 
                                                     
215  Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 BOSTON COLL. LAW REV. 1–136, 38–40 (2011); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The 
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219See pp 8-11 supra. Rivlin, Intergovernmental Management for the 21st Century, 299; Bagenstos, ‘Spending Clause 
Litigation in the Roberts Court’, 382.  
220  See pp 6-21 supra. 
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Viorica Viță 
24 Department of Law Working Papers 
First, it is argued that funding withdrawal hurts ultimately the most needy.222 Second, it is argued that 
withdrawal of funds is intrusive to states' sovereignty.223 Third, it is argued that withdrawal of funds 
delays spending as a whole.224 Fourth, it is claimed that the politics of funds denial is a sensitive issue 
and the bargaining process between states, executive agencies and legislative institutions is an 
important dissuasive factor.225  
Similar arguments against conditions enforcement are also voiced in the EU.226 As such, studies 
preparing the last 2014-2020 EU budgetary reform claimed that suspension of funds for non-
compliance with macroeconomic conditions risks to disproportionately affect less developed regions 
and its beneficiaries, raise questions of equal treatment of Member States, delay funding and hurt 
economic growth.227 Sovereignty concerns were additionally raised by Member States during 
negotiations.228 As to the politics behind funds withdrawal, the pressure on the Commission shall 
depend on a case by case basis. While the Commission could be more comfortable to suspend 
spending in areas of high consensus (i.e. on environmental conditions), the suspension of EU funds for 
non-compliance in more contentious areas (i.e. macroeconomic conditions) shall be highly difficult 
and would have to be firstly commonly agreed at the highest level of EU institutions.229  
Weak form judicial review 
Another important finding is that both the EU and the U.S. judiciary branches tend to adopt a 'weak-
form judicial review'230 when ruling on conditions, granting a high level of discretion to the legislative 
and executive branches in the design, implementation and enforcement of conditions.231 
The U.S. scholarly thinking on conceptual problems the U.S. Supreme Court faces when confronted 
with conditional spending adjudication is enlightening in this respect.232 As professor Bagenstos and 
Sunstein have argued, when dealing with conditional spending the courts are faced with deep 
normative choices on the scope of conditional spending, choices that are far from settled and are better 
suited for the democratic political deliberation in parliaments rather then for judicial scrutiny.233 In 
addition, Professor Fuller's theory on bipolar and polycentric disputes explains the limits courts face in 
cases that involve polycentric uncertainties234 such as cases involving questions on the 
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constitutionality or judicial enforcement of conditions. When attempting to adjudicate on conditions, 
the courts inevitably run into the polycentric difficulty of multiple economic, political and social 
preferences at stake that bring a high level of uncertainty to judicial deliberation.235 In result, a court 
shall more often than not find it very difficult to substitute its judgement to the legislative or 
administrative agencies, as the latter actors are generally better placed to balance with a higher level of 
accuracy the full range of considerations at stake.236 Consequently, courts shall necessarily find it 
easier to scrutinise conditions based on formal legality claims, such as prescription, access to justice or 
right to be heard, rather than examine the core of the problem of whether and to which extent a 
condition is constitutionally permissible. 
Finally, it is worth noting that in both EU and the U.S. systems, judicial review shall be most difficult 
in the case of conditions that present a rather remote or indirect link to spending. Take for instance a 
hypothetical 'rule of law' condition in the EU or a prohibition to carry 'guns on campus' condition in 
the U.S. linked to disbursement of research funds. To address this concerns, both EU and the US 
courts, have put in place judicial doctrines to ensure that a reasonably close link between spending and 
the cross-cutting condition exists. In this sense, the EU Court has institutionalised a 'sufficiently direct 
link' test, while the U.S. Supreme Court established the 'germaneness' criterion in Dole case to 
examine whether conditions are reasonably related to the federal interest in a given program.237 It is 
worth noting that both tests have proven little bite and credible constraint in practice. To date, the EU 
courts have never struck down conditions based on the 'sufficiently direct link' test. Similarly, the U.S. 
judiciary has adopted a broad reading of the 'germaneness' criterion, some judges even wondering if 
the criterion is justiciable, hence fit for adjudication in courts.238  
Differences 
Functions: U.S. regulation v. EU enforcement  
A core difference between the U.S. and EU cross-cutting conditions lies in the functions towards 
which their use is primarily directed. The comparative insight of the two legal systems shows that the 
primary function of conditional spending in the U.S. is regulation, while the primary function of 
spending conditionality in the EU is enforcement. In other words, whilst both in the U.S. and EU 
cross-cutting conditions may pursue multiple functions, in the U.S. the main goal of conditional 
spending has been to help expand the federal government's limited power to regulate; whereas in the 
EU, the aim of spending conditionality has been largely to help the EU enforce its extensive, already 
existent regulation and policies.  
The difference has a historical explanation. The U.S. Constitution has been amended only on limited 
occasions to expand the federal powers.239 This meant that the U.S. federal government had to explore 
                                                     
235 This limit is prominent in the final paragraph of Justice Breyer opinion in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius 567 U.S. 
(2012), supra note 6. : "[t]he Framers created a Federal Government of limited powers, and assigned to this Court the 
duty of enforcing those limits. The Court does so today. But the Court does not express any opinion on the wisdom of the 
Affordable Care Act. Under the Constitution, that judgment is reserved to the people." 
236 Barron and Rakoff, supra note 92 at 272–273; Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC 467 U.S. 837 (1984), JUSTIA LAW, 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/467/837/case.html (last visited Apr 7, 2017). 
237  South Dakota v. Dole 483 U.S. 203 (1987), supra note 134. 
238  Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and 
How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So Congressional Power in the Shadow of the Rehnquist Court: 
Strategies for the Future, 78 INDIANA LAW J. 459–542, 464–469 (2003). 
239  The 13th, 14th, 15th Reconstruction Amendments of 1865-1970, granting the Congress the power to enforce the 
guarantees enshrined therein by appropriate legislation and the 16th Amendment of 1913, granting the Congress the 
power to "lay and collect taxes on income". 
Viorica Viță 
26 Department of Law Working Papers 
different routes to regulate areas outside its reach, but where federal action was deemed necessary. 
The power to spend and adopt conditional spending programs was one of routes taken to this end.240 
Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the EU founding treaties have been repeatedly amended to expand the 
powers of the EU.241 As such, the EU treaties give the EU legislators important scope for regulation 
based on the EU's enumerated powers (exclusive, shared and coordinative competences), the EU's 
implied powers doctrine, as well as on the flexibility clause (Article 352 TFEU).242 Despite its 
extensive power to regulate and adopt broad policy lines, the EU remains limited in the power to 
enforce its regulation and policy; a limitation that became increasingly acute in the last years.243 
Spending conditionality is a tool largely seen as a remedy for the EU's enforcement deficit.244  
Specificity and clarity of conditions 
Another core difference is that conditions tend to be much more individual-tailored in the U.S. and 
largely state-tailored in the EU. The difference comes with the very different thematic purpose, 
amounts and subjects of U.S. and EU spending envelopes, that necessarily affect the conditionality's 
design and scope.  
The U.S. largest spending envelopes are directed to healthcare, social security, and education; and 
spending in these areas is often disbursed to private beneficiaries.245 The EU budget is largely 
committed to agriculture, rural and regional development, economic and social cohesion, and funds 
are disbursed largely to Member States' public authorities.246 Given the very different areas of 
spending and the Member States as primary beneficiaries, cross-cutting conditions are very different in 
the EU and tend to be largely state-tailored.  
As a result, EU conditions are often general and suggest only with a limited degree of clarity the 
effective conduct required, in comparison to their U.S. counterparts. There is also much less clarity for 
the EU citizens regarding the concrete action required by the EU spending conditions, the Member 
States action in response and the accountability in case of failure to achieve the prescribed result. The 
EU conditionality generally gains clarity and tangible social-economic impact only when translated at 
the national level of the EU-28 through program-specific requirements often negotiated between the 
Commission and the Member States. As such, at the EU level one rarely encounters conditions 
directly asking, for instance for: student performance or prohibition of smoking on campus. 
Nevertheless, such conditions may well shape at the national level during the implementation of EU-
wide conditions in the area of education, inclusion of vulnerable groups or poverty reduction.  
Private enforcement of conditions 
The comparative study also shows that private parties and citizens in general have been much more 
involved in the enforcement process of cross-cutting conditions in the U.S. as compared to the EU. 
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This difference finds its roots partially in the U.S. judicial doctrine on remedies247 as well as in the 
explicitly enshrined possibility under certain U.S. civil rights statutes to privately enforce cross-cutting 
conditions.248 Pursuant to the latter, interested persons can file a judicial complaint against public or 
private beneficiaries of U.S. federal grants asking for funding cut-off in case the said beneficiaries 
discriminate or otherwise violate the claimant's civil rights.249 
In the EU there is no similar decentralized private enforcement of conditionality.250 Hence, the 
compliance or non-compliance with a condition is exclusively a matter between the EU and Member 
States, and in case of non-compliance it is only for the EU - not for affected individuals - to enforce 
the conditionality and ask for funding cut-off.  
Let us take the example of discrimination to better illustrate the difference. In the EU an individual 
cannot take a state or another entity to EU courts for failure to respect a non-discrimination 
conditionality.251 After the start of funding operations, when a discrimination occurs, the individuals 
have access to an administrative complaint procedure at the national or EU level, which could lead to 
funding cut-off only if the Commission finds that the irregularity affected the selection procedure or 
the financial interests of the EU. However, outside these situations - for instance, if a university 
receiving EU funds has in place discriminatory practices - an individual cannot launch a complaint 
against the university or take it to court claiming funding cut-off for failure to comply with applicable 
non-discrimination law. The individual will have to address an administrative complaint to the 
Commission or, if discriminated against, seek individual relief under applicable national or EU non-
discrimination law - that would lead most often to an administrative fine. 
What can the EU learn from the U.S.?  
The experience of the U.S. shows that in spite of significant difficulties and criticism encountered 
along the way, conditional spending has proven a valuable tool of government. It proved particularly 
useful in promoting national policy imperatives and addressing collective action problems in areas as 
education, healthcare, social security or environmental protection.252  
Additionally, the study of the U.S. conditional spending doctrine and policies is particularly valuable 
as it shows that when used in federal-like and multilevel government setting, such as the one of the 
EU, conditionality is not simply a policy tool, but it is first and foremost a constitutional matter. As a 
consequence, the policy planning, administrative enforcement, judicial adjudication and legal study of 
conditionality should be conceived of only as an intrinsic part of the general principles and norms of 
the EU constitutional construction. In this context, the principles of conferral, legality, proportionality, 
equality of Member States, judicial redress, transparency, democratic accountability and fundamental 
rights must form an indissoluble integral part of all conditionality thinking in the EU.  
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Another important finding is that often conditions may fail and, as shown above, when that happens, 
both the administrative agencies and the judiciary have limited ex post tools to effectively correct 
under-preforming conditions. This leads us to the conclusion that a much more focused policy 
thinking on the initial, ex ante design of conditions is crucial for their successful operation of 
conditions and attainment of intended policy goals.  
Departing from the initial good design imperative, this section attempts to highlight a core set of 
lessons drawn from the U.S. experience which could be usefully considered during the next EU 
conditionality formulation cycle. 
Focusing conditions on policy objectives  
A first lesson learned from the US experience is that the full and correct fulfillment of a condition does 
not necessarily mean that the policy objective pursued has been actually achieved.253 The condition’s 
policy objective relies on a clear and measurable focus on results and is not always fulfilled by a mere 
compliance with the condition's criteria.254  
The current EU conditions tend to suffer from the same disconnect between the actions prescribed and 
policy results sought. Let us take the example of the EU ex ante conditionality on gender equality to 
better emphasize the point.255 The condition asks for inter-institutional arrangements with equality 
bodies and training of officials in charge of EU Funds on gender equality matters. Yet, even if both 
requirements are fully complied with, there is a clear risk that conditions turn into formal box ticking 
exercises with little positive impact on EU gender equality policy.256 To avoid this outcome, the 
criteria for fulfillment must constantly be assessed against the primary policy goal of gender 
equality.257 Therefore, the condition must not ask whether there is a plan, but whether the content of 
the plan and its actual implementation is consistent with EU equality policy. Moreover, the conditions 
must not ask about a training report but about the training results. Beyond asking whether there is an 
inter-institutional agreement with equality bodies, the condition must ask whether these have the 
actual capacity to turn the inter-institutional agreement into reality. 
Overall, the baseline assessment revolves around a cost-benefit analysis and the question of whether or 
not the policy is better off with a condition or without it.258 If a given condition brings no added value 
to the policy goal pursued (i.e. gender equality), then spending is better off without a condition 
altogether. By analogy, as hard as it may be to articulate it, EU spending may be better off with no 
gender equality condition than with a badly designed one, as the implementation of a badly designed 
condition consumes important resources which could have found a more useful allocation in its 
absence. 
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Balancing conditions and spending  
The U.S. experience repeatedly underlines the importance of carefully balancing the policy objectives 
of conditions with the policy objectives of spending.259 Starting with the initial financial assistance 
reform of the 1970s and ending up with the most recent one, all U.S. administrations were 
continuously concerned with the excessive burden conditions may pose on spending itself.260 
The EU practice with conditionality seems to follow a similar path. Here, it is interesting to recall the 
initial statement of the EU Commissioner for Regional Policy: “[t]his time around no money will be 
spent if the right conditions are not there, so there is no getting away from ex ante conditionalities”.261 
Whilst the EU Commissioner's statement might have appealed politically at the start of the financial 
period, today the serious delays in spending suggest a different discourse.262 While there are many 
culprits to blame for the current spending delay, conditionality is beyond doubt one of them.263 The 
delay means that EU funds may not fully reach by the end of the financial period their primary 
milestones. The latter are all highly valuable policy goals, of at least comparable importance to 
conditionalities, such as: transportation networks, internet and technology infrastructure, shift to low 
carbon economy, resource efficiency, et al. The concern is of high priority especially in the current 
economic climate where EU Member States rely dramatically on EU financial resources to support 
domestic growth.  
The EU has no interest to block EU money. EU's interest is to spend EU money in a correct and 
effective manner, while having the conditions complied with to the fullest possible extent. Ultimately, 
to ensure the well-functioning of the overall system, the trade-off between spending and the number 
of conditions attached shall have to be carefully reassessed. 
Dealing with complexity 
The U.S. experience with conditions has shown a continuous attention to the raising complexity and 
administrative burden.264 Demanding paperwork requirements and bureaucratic red-tape have been 
repeatedly reported as major obstacles in the effective administration of conditions.265 The fact that 
administrative simplification has been a constant goal on U.S. financial reform agenda since the 1980s 
and still continues today suggests that dealing with complexity may prove very difficult in a multi-
level government.266 
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The current EU experience seems to echo the same complexity concerns. Conditions brought a 
substantive administrative burden both for the EU and Member States administrations.267 While 
conditions were adopted in the 2014-2020 financial framework in the name of funding effectiveness 
and efficiency, the increased complexity, administrative burden and overlaps risk leading precisely to 
the opposite result. Here one could usefully mention the 'over-regulation – under-regulation' paradox 
voiced in the U.S. scholarship.268 When applied to conditions, the paradox of over-regulation tells us 
that more complex and demanding conditions (overregulation) tend to be more difficult to implement 
and are very likely to encounter strong resistance from state administrations and final beneficiaries. 
Such overregulated conditions risk to be self-defeating, and reach only a limited or even an opposite 
policy result to the one initially intended; thus, leading to under-regulation.269 
As mentioned already, addressing complexity has not been an easy policy task in the U.S. where 
simplification reforms are still under way.270 In turn, EU shall have to undertake its own policy 
thinking and come up with EU-tailored simplification solutions.  
The U.S. experience with condition waivers on the one hand, and high risk grantees, on the other, may 
provide a starting example for adjusting the conditions to the needs and capacity of their recipients.271 
The system allows for relaxing or tightening the conditions on a case-by-case basis and may facilitate 
simplification and a more balanced distribution of conditions in result. Waivers usually exempt 
recipients from certain conditions272 and replace the latter with a set of principles or standards to be 
observed.273 On the contrary, high risk grantees are closely monitored on their performance.274 A 
differentiation between EU Funds recipients has been already proposed by professor Barca in the 2009 
report on the future of EU Cohesion policy.275 Adjusting the volume of conditions to the need and 
capacity of recipients would imply that the planning process would start not by asking how many 
objectives the EU would like to see accomplished through spending conditions, but how many 
objectives are effectively needed and how many conditions can be realistically handled by the final 
beneficiary. Waivers may be considered where the States prove that equivalent and satisfactory 
measures are already in place. In contrast, high risk recipients with a weak track-record on conditions 
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implementation would receive more technical assistance, whilst being closer monitored by the EU. 
This could avoid overburdening local administrations and allow for the much-needed local flexibility, 
experimentation and innovation. A phasing-out process must be foreseen to facilitate the transition 
between the two categories. Highly important, such a differentiation system must pay a close attention 
to the principles of equality and non-discrimination.276 
Establishing uniform and stable legal frameworks  
The U.S. experience with spending conditions highlights the importance of a uniform, stable and 
streamlined legal framework on spending conditions and their subsequent interpretation.277 As shown 
by past U.S. programs, a fulfilled condition is only the beginning.278 Achieving conditions results (i.e. 
civil rights promotion in education) may prove a much more complex and long lasting process of trail 
and error, continuous adjustments and effort.279 To achieve results, a condition must be governed by 
stable legal frameworks pursuant to which it is continuously applied, observed, enforced, reviewed 
and internalized to a given legal, political, administrative and institutional culture.280  
From this point of view, the current EU legal framework is not a good fit for conditions for two main 
reasons. First, the current EU legal framework adopted on seven-year basis is too short to allow a 
sizable result for conditions. Changing the conditions' rules of the game every seven years repeatedly 
delays the achievement of results. The ultimate risk is that both Member States and EU 
administrations never get over the formal paperwork and control exercise.  
Second, the EU temporary legal framework hinders the full operation of conditions. If the Commission 
is too active in withdrawing funding or insisting on a rigorous fulfilment of conditions, Member States 
will have the tendency to get rid of 'troubling' conditions in the next financial period.281 
In this sense the seven-year cycle of the EU budgetary spending may be a highly disruptive factor for 
conditions. The policy objectives to be achieved by the current conditions often imply large scale 
structural, legal and policy reforms, which cannot be but formally implemented in seven years’ time. 
Changing the conditions together with the seven-year life spam of EU budget risks jeopardizing the 
first progress achieved. It also makes the EU policy objectives vulnerable to polycentric, hugely 
diverging and often short-sighted financial interests of Member States.  
For the above reasons, a stable and uniform legal framework should be preferred. Single rules shall 
also need one single master in charge of their consistent interpretation. Therefore, if the above 
proposal is taken on board, the current fragmented interpretation of conditions by each Directorate 
General of the Commission in charge of thematic spending should be revisited.282 This would allow 
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for the much-needed coherence and legal certainty for Member States administrations in charge of 
implementation.  
Improving institutional coordination 
Another lesson from the U.S. experience, closely related to the one above, is that the good operation of 
conditions needs leadership and permanent institutional coordination first of all at the federal level. As 
such, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is in charge since the 1970s of coordination of 
awarding agencies and uniform interpretation of financial assistance rules.283 The recent reform, led to 
the establishment of an Council on Financial Assistance Reform (CFAR) in 2011284 tasked to assist 
the OMB, to develop uniform guidance, training material and metrics on spending in general and 
conditions of spending in particular.285 The CFAR is formed from representatives of awarding 
agencies and the OMB. 286 
From this point of view, the EU system shows a mismatch between the new conditions and the old 
institutional arrangements. While temporary inter-institutional structures on ex ante conditionality 
implementation and suspension are in place, no permanent inter-institutional structures are present.287 
Moreover, there is no ultimate and stable inter-institutional authority in charge of guiding the 
interpretation and implementation of spending conditions across the thematic expenditure lines of 
agriculture, cohesion, development, social, home affairs and fisheries funding, even if those funds 
present very often high similarities. While, the Commission Directorates responsible for spending 
management take the lead in the discussions, the Directorates responsible for policy implementation 
have only consultative role. Therefore, the implementation and evaluation of conditionality's policy 
results remain strongly compartmentalized at the EU level. Revisiting the EU inter-institutional 
cooperation and deciding on leadership could be an additional important item of the next financial 
reform agenda. 
Building capacity 
The U.S. experience showed that advancing policy goals through spending is a highly complex 
enterprise which requires advanced capacity at all levels of government.288 Numerous U.S. case 
studies on non-discrimination, minority inclusion in education and labor market, inclusion of persons 
with disabilities or labor rights conditions vividly show how important it is to match the conditions 
with the real capacities on the ground.289 To ensure that conditions operate well and achieve the 
intended results, the states officials in charge of funds management and control must prove high level 
of expertise in multiple cross-cutting disciplines. To this end, the U.S. 2009 reform has tasked the 
Council on Financial Assistance Reform (CFAR) to coordinate training on effective and efficient 
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funds management at the federal level.290 The developed trainings are subsequently available online 
for the use of state administrations and grant managers.291 
In the EU, capacity building and training is still primarily designed and undertaken at the state level, 
by the 28 EU Member States' administrations. Moreover, training is often outsourced and presents 
vague or no EU-wide directions. Such a system may be counterproductive.  
Let us take again the example of gender equality conditionality to support this claim. The condition 
requires training of state officials on EU law and policies on gender equality.292 Yet, training is left 
entirely to the Member States. Two problems arise in this context. First, the training content and scope 
differ tremendously from one Member State to another, meaning that gender equality may have a 
different meaning throughout 28 EU administrations in charge of EU Funds management.293 Second, a 
quick look at training modules prepared in Italy and Romania shows that trainings were rarely linked 
to EU spending, basic notions of economic development or EU gender mainstreaming.294 Moreover, 
training offered participants only a few practical tools to help them give meaning to gender equality in 
the specific context of EU Funds. 295 Ultimately, if one asks whether EU funds are better off with a 
gender equality training condition than without, the answer shall be at best a mixed feeling in this 
particular case. 
The bottom line question is: who is the better placed actor to train national officials on correct and 
efficient spending management and conditions implementation: the EU or Member States? The answer 
must be: both, the EU and Member States. Nevertheless, the EU must necessarily take the lead by 
preparing EU-wide training modules easily accessible online and require that subsequent national 
training include essential minimum standards, necessary for a meaningful training at state level. Such 
minimum standards must at least include a basic understanding on what the conditions mean in the EU 
context, how they may prove useful for state-specific EU funding and what are the ways to actually 
translate the condition policy goals into the every-day practice of EU funds operation. General and 
abstract training, while interesting for participants, will add little if anything to the specific context of 
EU spending in a given Member State so long as officials are not given tailored advice and relevant 
examples on how i.e. gender, environment or any other policy goal promoted through conditionality 
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may be effectively reflected in their everyday work. Additionally, coordinating training from the EU 
level may prove more financially efficient.  
Acknowledging the costs of conditions 
The assumption that conditions bear no budgetary cost has been heavily criticized and ultimately well 
acknowledged in the U.S.296 Not the same is true for the EU, where spending conditions are still 
largely297 presented as cost-free governance tools that are meant to achieve fundamental reforms at no 
additional price.298 This presumption is wrong and must be necessarily revisited. Conditions do cost. 
The well-functioning of conditions relies greatly on year-marked human and budgetary resources 
meant to cover for expertise, administrative and operational costs of conditions. Only the 
implementation of the training criterion of gender equality, non-discrimination and disability 
conditions in one single Member State in the 2014-2020 period involved a cost of EUR 1,5 million 
EUR from EU resources and half a million in state matching funds.299  
Indeed, not every condition will imply a high cost of implementation. Some Member States might 
have already committed resources and institutionalized procedures to deal with certain conditions. 
Others however have not. Therefore, an accurate assessment of conditions' cost at the very incipient 
stages of conditions planning would avoid situations where insufficient or unforeseen financial, time 
and administrative costs hinder the well-functioning of conditions. At the same time, a cost assessment 
exercise would usefully assist both the EU and its Member States in taking informed decisions 
concerning the conditions' necessity, potential and expected results. 
Enforcing conditions in a robust and transparent manner 
The U.S. general practice of under-enforcement of conditions has been challenged by constitutional 
scholars.300 In the case of EU, one must also restate that as a general finding conditions are rarely 
formally enforced against Member States, however informally, Member States and the Commission 
agreed not to spend EU funds until the conditions are fulfilled, thus a de facto (self-) enforcement 
mechanism has been put in place.301  
This state of the art is not satisfactory as it gravely hinders the principles of transparency and 
accountability that guide the exercise of power inside the EU. Whilst suspension of funds may 
certainly not always be desirable, the suspension of funds or the deferral of suspension must be 
transparent and dully reasoned. The enforcement or not of a condition is about much more than the 
suspension of money. It sends a clear political message for compliance. It allows the European citizens 
to hold their states accountable for failure to comply. It enables stakeholders to mobilize and actively 
engage with the state authorities in the process of compliance. Enforcement also encourages public 
participation and alternative solutions if conditions turn too intrusive or badly designed. All these 
benefits are eroded by the informal enforcement or by the failure to enforce the conditions altogether. 
Whilst the Commission may have reasonable motives not to enforce certain conditions, a generalized 
policy of non-enforcement or informal enforcement should be reconsidered. 
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Alternatively, similar to the civil rights conditions in the U.S.,302 the option of decentralized 
enforcement of conditions by individuals may be considered to shift the politically uncomfortable and 
resource limited enforcement burden from the Commission to private beneficiaries of funds. In such a 
scenario, individuals could also hold States liable for failure to implement spending conditionality and 
exert additional pressure on state governments to comply. 
Conclusion  
The EU funds are a crucial EU policy tool, highly visible and immediately tangible to the European 
citizens. The conditions attached to them in the 2014-2020 financial framework are very recent and 
little explored. This paper has tried to assess the conditions' impact and potential departing from the 
U.S. long standing experience on the matter.  
The paper found that EU is where U.S. was about half a century ago in experimenting with 
conditionality's promise and achievements. In spite of wide constitutional debates on the use of 
conditions, these have been employed in a sustained manner by both progressive and conservative 
governments to achieve important policy goals, especially when alternative tools proved insufficient.  
Findings drawn from the U.S. experience inform the EU that the use of conditional spending is above 
all a constitutional matter and must be used with due regards to the internal constitutional safeguards. 
The U.S. experience additionally informs us that administrative under-enforcement and a weak form 
judicial review is not only specific for the EU system, but is rather a general trait of conditional 
spending. This led us to the conclusion that the good initial design of conditionality is of crucial 
importance to its successful operation.  
Departing from this conclusion the last part of the paper attempted to list some of the most relevant 
lessons learned that could enrich the current EU reform discussions on conditionality. The lessons 
learned showed that conditions must be better matched to their policy objectives, harmoniously 
complement the overall spending execution process, be integrated in well-coordinated administrative 
structures, enjoy stable legal and institutional frameworks, with due attention to the recipient's 
capacity and implementation costs. This paper also argued for a more transparent enforcement of 
conditions. 
Overall, the findings above show that spending conditionality may be a highly useful, yet highly 
context-dependent governance device, subject to a large array of limitations. Therefore, a thoughtful 
ex ante policy planning of conditionality that closely observes the structural limitations and 
constitutional guarantees underlined above is crucial for the successful operation of the tool at the EU 
level. 
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